A field guide to bullshit.

How do people defend their beliefs in bizarre conspiracy theories or the power of crystals? Philosopher Stephen Law has tips for spotting their strategies.

You describe your new book, Believing Bullshit, as a guide to avoid getting sucked into "intellectual black holes". What are they?
Intellectual black holes are belief systems that draw people in and hold them captive so they become willing slaves of claptrap. Belief in homeopathy, psychic powers, alien abductions - these are examples of intellectual black holes. As you approach them, you need to be on your guard because if you get sucked in, it can be extremely difficult to think your way clear again.

But isn't one person's claptrap another's truth?
There's a belief system about water to which we all sign up: it freezes at 0 °C and boils at 100 °C. We are powerfully wedded to this but that doesn't make it an intellectual black hole. That's because these beliefs are genuinely reasonable. Beliefs at the core of intellectual black holes, however, aren't reasonable. They merely appear so to those trapped inside.

You identify some strategies people use to defend black hole beliefs. Tell me about one of them - "playing the mystery card"?
This involves appealing to mystery to get out of intellectual hot water when someone is, say, propounding paranormal beliefs. They might say something like: "Ah, but this is beyond the ability of science and reason to decide. You, Mr Clever Dick Scientist, are guilty of scientism, of assuming science can answer every question." This is often followed by that quote from Shakespeare's Hamlet: "There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy". When you hear that, alarm bells should go off.

But even scientists admit that they can't explain everything.
There probably are questions that science cannot answer. But what some people do to protect their beliefs is to draw a veil across reality and say, "you scientists can go up to the veil and apply your empirical methods this far, but no further". Behind the veil they will put angels, aliens, psychic powers, God, ghosts and so on. Then they insist that there are special people who can see - if only dimly - through this veil. But the fact is that many of the claims made about things behind this veil have empirically observable consequences and that makes them scientifically testable.

How can science test these mysteries?
Psychologist Christopher French at Goldsmiths, University of London, ran an experiment into the effects of crystals to explore claims that holding "real" crystals from a New Age shop while meditating has a powerful effect on the psyche, more so than just holding "fake" ones. But French found no difference in participants using real and fake crystals. This was good evidence that the effect people report is down to the power of suggestion, not the crystals.

Of course, this study provoked comments such as: "Not being able to prove the existence of something does not disprove its existence. Much is yet to be discovered." This is just a smokescreen. But because the mantra "it's-beyond-the-ability-of-science-to-establish..." gets repeated so often, it is effective at lulling people back to sleep - even if they have been stung into entertaining a doubt for a moment or two.

Do you think mystery has a place in science?
Some things may be beyond our understanding, and sometimes it's reasonable to appeal to mystery. If you have excellent evidence that water boils at 100 °C, but on one occasion it appeared it didn't, it's reasonable to attribute that to some mysterious, unknown factor. It's also reasonable, when we have a theory that works but we don't know how it works, to say that this is currently a mystery. But the more we rely on mystery to get us out of intellectual trouble, or the more we use it as a carpet under which to sweep inconvenient facts, the more vulnerable we are to deceit, by others and by ourselves.

In your book you also talk about the "going nuclear" tactic. What is this?
When someone is cornered in an argument, they may decide to get sceptical about reason. They might say: "Ah, but reason is just another faith position." I call this "going nuclear" because it lays waste to every position. It brings every belief - that milk can make you fly or that George Bush was Elvis Presley in disguise - down to the same level so they all appear equally "reasonable" or "unreasonable". Of course, you can be sure that the moment this person has left the room, they will continue to use reason to support their case if they can, and will even trust their life to reason: trusting that the brakes on their car will work or that a particular drug is going to cure them.

Isn't there a grain of truth in this approach?
There is a classic philosophical puzzle about how to justify reason: to do so, it seems you have to use reason. So the justification is circular - a bit like trusting a second-hand car salesman because he says he's trustworthy. But the person who "goes nuclear" isn't genuinely sceptical about reason. They are just raising a philosophical problem as a smokescreen, to give them time to leave with their head held high, saying: "So my belief is as reasonable as yours." That's intellectually dishonest.

You say we should also be aware of the "but it fits" strategy. Why?
Any theory, no matter how ludicrous, can be squared with the evidence, given enough ingenuity. Every last anomaly can be explained away. There is a popular myth about science that if you can make your theory consistent with the evidence, then that shows it is confirmed by that evidence - as confirmed as any other theory. Lots of dodgy belief systems exploit this myth. Young Earth creationism - the view that the whole universe is less than 10,000 years old - is a good example. Given enough shoehorning and reinterpretation, you can make whatever turns up "fit" what the Bible says.

What about when people claim that they "just know" something is right?
Suppose I look out the window and say: "Hey, there's Ted." You say: "It can't be Ted because he's on holiday." I reply: "Look, I just know it's Ted." Here it might be reasonable for you to take my word for it.

But "I just know" also gets used when I present someone with good evidence that there are, say, no auras, angels or flying saucers, and they respond: "Look, I just know there are." In such cases, claiming to "just know" is usually very unreasonable indeed.

What else should we watch out for?
You should be suspicious when people pile up anecdotes in favour of their pet theory, or when they practise the art of pseudo-profundity - uttering seemingly profound statements which are in fact trite or nonsensical. They often mix in references to scientific theory to sound authoritative.

Why does it matter if we believe absurd things?
It can cause no great harm. But the dangers are obvious when people join extreme cults or use alternative medicines to treat serious diseases. I am particularly concerned by psychological manipulation. For charlatans, the difficulty with using reason to persuade is that it's a double-edged sword: your opponent may show you are the one who is mistaken. That's a risk many so-called "educators" aren't prepared to take. If you try using reason to persuade adults the Earth's core is made of cheese, you will struggle. But take a group of kids, apply isolation, control, repetition, emotional manipulation - the tools of brainwashing - and there's a good chance many will eventually accept what you say.

Profile

Stephen Law is senior lecturer in philosophy at Heythrop College, University of London, and editor of the Royal Institute of Philosophy journal, Think. His latest book is Believing Bullshit: How not to get sucked into an intellectual black hole.

Source New Scientist

UI study examines link between teen sex and divorce rate

A University of Iowa study found that women who make their sexual debut as young teens are more likely to divorce, especially if "the first time" was unwanted, or if she had mixed feelings about it.
Published in the April issue of the Journal of Marriage and Family, the analysis found that 31 percent of women who had sex for the first time as teens divorced within five years, and 47 percent divorced within 10 years. The divorce rate for women who delayed sex until adulthood was far lower: 15 percent at five years, and 27 percent at 10 years.

Author Anthony Paik, associate professor of sociology in the UI College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, examined the responses of 3,793 ever-married women to the 2002 National Survey of Family Growth.
A first sexual experience that was unwanted or not completely wanted was strongly associated with divorce. If the young woman chose to lose her virginity as a teen, the results were more nuanced.
When the first intercourse took place early in adolescence –- before the age of 16 –- the women were more likely to divorce, even if that first sexual experience was wanted.

If the young woman waited until age 16 or 17 and the first sex was wanted, there was no direct link to dissolution down the road. But, while the sex itself did not increase the likelihood of a marital split, other factors related to sexuality -– such as a higher number of sexual partners, pregnancy, or out-of-wedlock birth -– increased the risk for some respondents.

Thirty-one percent of women who experienced adolescent sexual debut had premarital sex with multiple partners, compared to 24 percent of those who waited. Twenty-nine percent experienced premarital conceptions, versus 15 percent who waited. And, one in four women who had sex during their teenage years had a baby before they were married, compared to only one in ten who held off.
"The results are consistent with the argument that there are down sides to adolescent sexuality, including the increased likelihood of divorce," Paik said. "But there's also support for the 'more sex positive' view, because if a teen delays sex to late adolescence and it is wanted, that choice in itself doesn't necessarily lead to increased risk of divorce."

Only a small percentage of women who had sex before age 18 said it was completely wanted. Just 1 percent chose to have sex at age 13 or younger, 5 percent at age 14 or 15, and 10 percent at age 16 or 17. Another 42 percent reported first sexual intercourse before age 18 that was not completely wanted, while the remaining portion of the sample waited until age 18 or older to have sex (wanted, 22 percent; unwanted, 21 percent).
Paik said there are a couple potential explanations for the link between teen sex and divorce.
"One possibility is a selection explanation, that the women who had sex as adolescents were predisposed to divorce. The attitudes that made them feel OK about having sex as teens may have also influenced the outcome of their marriage," Paik said. "The other possibility is a causal explanation –- that the early sexual experience led to the development of behaviors or beliefs that promote divorce."

In a statistical analysis, he found more evidence for the latter, suggesting that the sexual experiences as a teen affected the marriage. The results related to unwanted sex supported his hunch. Nevertheless, he cautions that it is too early to rule out the selection explanation.
"If the sex was not completely wanted or occurred in a traumatic context, it's easy to imagine how that could have a negative impact on how women might feel about relationships, or on relationship skills," Paik said. "The experience could point people on a path toward less stable relationships."

Limitations of the study included a lack of information on respondents' work status, which is often used as a control factor in divorce research, and the fact that the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention data included some imputed values. Paik arrived at the same results by excluding the imputed figures, but would like to repeat the study with the new 2006-08 data to confirm that the findings still hold.
"It's a timely topic, given the current debate over the sexualization of girls," Paik said. "This study tries to provide some answers about adolescent sexuality and the risk of marital dissolution, and the results show that both the context and early onset of first intercourse are associated with divorce."

Source University of Iowa

Facebook friends? Group identity helps consumers remember ads

When consumers think about the groups they belong to, they recall ads better, according to a new study in the Journal of Consumer Research.

"A key determinant of how much consumers remember from an ad is the connection between the ad content and the consumer's own self-concept," write authors Kathryn R. Mercurio (UCLA) and Mark Forehand (University of Washington, Seattle).
Consumers identify with many different demographic groups, such as race, gender, or age. They also identify with family role groups (mother, father, sister), or occupational groups such as lawyer, teacher, or politician. And they sometimes identify with brand consumption groups (Mac, Harley Davidson, Facebook). Although consumers identify with a large set of groups, at any given time they only think about a small set of them, called the active self-concept.

Advertising often includes information or images that encourage consumers to think about groups they belong to, and research has demonstrated that consumers temporarily prefer brands that target those specific groups. For example, a tampax commercial helps female consumers think about their gender self-concept and makes them more responsive to other ads that are aimed toward their gender.

The authors also found that thinking about one's group membership influences memory for advertising. "Specifically, when a consumer views advertising while they are also thinking about one of their group memberships they unconsciously connect the new information to the group membership in memory," the authors write. Later, when those consumers think about that group membership, they are more likely to remember the information they learned earlier.

"Pragmatically, this suggests that advertisers should consider how consumers are likely to think about themselves when they are choosing products," the authors conclude.

Source  EurekaAlert!

How serious is son preference in China?

Why are female foetuses aborted in China? Does an increase in the number of abortions of female foetuses reflect an increase in son preference? Sociologist Lisa Eklund from Lund University in Sweden has studied why families in China have a preference for sons.

At the time of the census in 2005, almost 121 boys were born for every 100 girls. Last year's census showed that sex ratio at birth (SRB) had improved somewhat. But it is still too early to celebrate, in Eklund's view: the narrowing of the gap does not necessarily mean that girls are valued more highly.

Because of the high SRB, there has been a tendency to picture China as a country where son preference is strong and possibly increasing since the 1980s. However, Eklund argues in her PhD thesis that using SRB as a proxy indicator for son preference is problematic. She has therefore developed a model to estimate what she calls "son compulsion", where data on SRB and total fertility rate are used to estimate the proportion of couples who wants to give birth to at least one son and who take action to achieve that goal. When looking at variation in son compulsion over time and between regions, Eklund finds that new patterns emerge that do not surface when using SRB as a proxy indicator. Contrary to popular belief, son compulsion remained steady in rural China (at around 10 per cent) while it increased in urban China in the 1990s (from 2.8 per cent to 4.5 per cent).

"This doubling concurred in time with cuts in the state welfare system in the cities, which meant that adult sons were given a more important role in providing for the social and financial security of the elderly", she says. Her findings call into question the assumption that son preference is essentially a rural issue. They also have implications for comparative perspectives and her findings suggest that son compulsion may be higher in other countries even though they expose lower SRB.

When it emerged that far more boys than girls were being born in China, the Chinese government launched the Care for Girls Campaign to improve the value of the girl child and to prevent sex-selective abortion. Nonetheless, the imbalance between the sexes continued to increase. Eklund's findings suggest that the campaign may actually have done more harm than good. Families receive extra support if they have girls and in rural areas exceptions are made from the one-child policy if the first child is a girl.
"By compensating parents of girls in various ways, the government reinforces the idea that girls are not as valuable as boys", says Eklund.
Eklund further challenges the notion that families in rural areas want sons because sons are expected to take over the farming.

"That is a weak argument", says Eklund. "Young people, both men and women, are moving away from rural areas. Of those who stay, women provide just as much help as men. In fact, it is the elderly who end up taking greater responsibility for the agriculture."
However, there are also other reasons why sons are seen as more important for families. Traditionally, a girl moves in with her husband's family when she gets married and she thus cannot look after her own parents when they grow old. Boys also play an important role in ancestor worship, and they ensure that the family name lives on.

Eklund further finds that there is a stubbornness in both popular and official discourses to view son preference as a matter of parents and grandparents without looking at structural factors that help underpin the institution of son preference.

Source  EurekaAlert!